We link the corporate governance literature in financial economics to the agency cost perspective of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to derive theoretical predictions about the relationship between corporate governance and the existence of executive compensation incentives for CSR. We test our predictions using novel executive compensation contract data, and find that firms with more shareholder-friendly corporate governance are more likely to provide compensation to executives linked to firm social performance outcomes. Also, providing executives with direct incentives for CSR is an effective tool to increase firm social performance. The findings provide evidence identifying corporate governance as a determinant of managerial incentives for social performance, and suggest that CSR activities are more likely to be beneficial to shareholders, as opposed to an agency cost.
Introduction
Over the last several decades, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities have become an increasingly important investment by firms. 1 The growing significance of CSR as a phenomenon has raised a fundamental question: Does CSR enhance shareholder value, or is it an agency cost enjoyed by a firm's managers at the expense of stockholders? While a substantial number of studies have examined this question from different perspectives, the evidence continues to be conflicting (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Margolis et al., 2009; Borghesi et al., 2014; Kruger, 2014; Masulis and Reza, 2014) . In this study, we investigate the agency cost perspective of CSR using a novel empirical test that exploits variation in corporate governance across firms to predict the existence of executive compensation contracts linked directly to CSR activities. Our findings suggest that corporate governance is an important mechanism determining whether managers receive compensation linked to firm social performance outcomes, and that executive compensation for CSR leads to more CSR activities. To the best of our knowledge, our study provides the first quantitative empirical evidence identifying factors that lead to executive compensation for CSR.
In the debate among scholars about the effects of CSR on firm financial performance, one of the most prominent arguments against the financial benefits of CSR has been the agency cost prediction first made by Friedman (1970) , who characterized CSR activities as self-interested behavior by individual managers at the expense of the firm's shareholders. 2 Subsequent studies have found supporting evidence of CSR as a potential agency cost, finding that CSR may be used to advance personal interests over the interests of shareholders (Brown et al., 2006; Jiraporn and Chintrakarn, 2013; Borghesi et al., 2014; Cheng et al., 2014; Kruger, 2014; Masulis and Reza, 2014) , provide added job security to inefficient managers by pleasing stakeholders (Cespa and Cestone, 2007) , compensate for the negative consequences of engaging in earnings management (Prior et al., 2008) , and enhance individual reputations of managers (Barnea and Rubin, 2010) .
However, a number of studies have also found a positive relationship between CSR activities and 1 For example, some 63% of CEOs surveyed in the UN Global Compact-Accenture CEO Study on Sustainability (2013) expected sustainability to transform their industry within five years.
2 McWilliams et al. (2006) and Gao and Bansal (2012) provide overviews of the major theoretical perspectives regarding CSR and financial performance. In this study, however, we focus only on the agency cost argument.
firm financial performance (Orlitsky et al., 2003) . Despite the considerable amount of academic attention, few definitive conclusions can be drawn from the collection of findings produced thus far.
In addition to the conflicting academic evidence, anecdotal evidence from firms with strong public commitments to CSR can also provide ambiguous conclusions. For example, consider the outdoor clothing company Patagonia, which donates 1% of its revenues to environmental organizations. In a case study by Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2009, p.209) , a former senior manager at the company provides potentially conflicting views of the financial benefits of CSR, stating both that they seek to "dispel the myth that in order to have a high quality product you have to have something damaging to the environment," and then later stating "There is some tension between the environment and product quality...the reality is that they don't always go hand in hand." These seemingly opposing statements raise more questions than answers in addressing whether CSR is truly beneficial for firm financial performance, or a net cost to the firm's shareholders.
With respect to agency costs, a fundamental premise of the corporate governance literature within the field of financial economics is the notion that improved corporate governance ultimately leads to improved firm financial performance and value created for shareholders through the adoption of shareholder-friendly policies and the reduction of agency costs (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003, 2010) . More shareholder-friendly (better) corporate governance is achieved through the implementation of rules, practices, and incentives to align the interests of a firm's managers with shareholders. As a consequence, shareholders benefit economically by advocating for improved corporate governance.
In this paper, we link the corporate governance literature in financial economics and the agency cost perspective of CSR to derive theoretical predictions about the relationship between corporate governance and the existence of executive compensation contracts that provide incentives for firm social performance. The underlying theoretical logic of our test is a straightforward extension of the agency cost perspective: If CSR is truly an agency cost at the expense of a firm's shareholders, then firms with better corporate governance should be less likely to compensate their managers for CSR outcomes. If, however, CSR increases shareholder value, better corporate governance should predict a higher likelihood of observing executive compensation contracts that provide incentives for firm social performance. Given that the structure of executive compensation contracts is a direct outcome of a firm's governance process (e.g., Yermack, 1997; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) , we are able to infer whether CSR activities are truly agency costs, or beneficial for firm financial performance.
The relationship between corporate governance and CSR activities within firms has received increasing attention among scholars, motivated by the potentially important role of governance in influencing socially responsible firm behavior (see Walls et al., 2012 for a review). However, the literature has thus far produced contradictory results, finding evidence of negative (Coombs and Gilley, 2005; David et al., 2007) , insignificant (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Schnatterly 2003) , and positive (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Jo and Harjoto, 2011; Oh et al., 2011; Rupley et al., 2012) relationships between corporate governance and CSR. We argue one possible reason for the inconsistency in previous findings may be the lack of empirical measures at the individual manager level of the channels through which corporate governance may influence CSR. Given that the purpose of corporate governance is to influence managerial decision-making (Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990) , the effects of governance on firm social performance are likely to occur through its influence on individual managers. A more detailed examination of these channels may be necessary in order to better understand the nature of the relationship between corporate governance and CSR.
Similarly, a nascent literature has examined the effect of executive compensation on CSR, but has also found conflicting results (Mahoney and Thorn, 2006) . McGuire et al. (2003) 3 We also find that when managers have greater individual power within the firm and governance is less shareholder-friendly (weaker), they are less likely to have executive compensation contracts tied to CSR outcomes. A one standard deviation increase in the shares outstanding owned by an executive predicts an 8% decline in the odds of observing incentives linked to CSR, and the odds decline 19% if the executive is also a member of the board of directors.
Taken together, the results provide evidence against the notion of CSR as an agency cost at the expense of shareholders, and suggest that CSR activities are likely to provide at least some form of economic benefit for firms. In addition, we find a positive relationship between the presence of explicit incentive compensation for CSR and actual firm-level CSR activities.
Our paper makes five main contributions. First, our findings establish explicit compensation for CSR as one important channel through which corporate governance may influence CSR outcomes, identifying a clear mechanism through which corporate governance may influence firm social performance. Second, by being the first to directly measure CSR contracting, we are able to demonstrate a clear positive relationship between a component of executive compensation structure (incentives for CSR) and firm social performance, contributing to the growing literature examining how executive compensation and CSR activities might be related. Third, we contribute more broadly to the literature examining executive compensation for non-financial performance measures, which finds that including incentives for value-relevant performance measures beyond purely financial performance metrics can improve managerial incentives (Chen et al., 2014; Davila and Venkatachalam, 2004; Ibrahim and Lloyd, 2011; Ittner et al., 1997; Schiehll and Bellavance, 2009 value, complementing a number of studies that find a positive relationship between CSR and firm financial performance, and contrary to the agency cost prediction.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop our hypotheses linking corporate governance and executive compensation contracts tied to CSR. In Section 3, we describe our data and measures, and our empirical analysis. In Section 4, we present and discuss the empirical results. In Section 5, we offer conclusions.
Hypotheses
Corporate governance is concerned with the mechanisms through which shareholders ensure a financial return on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . The fundamental dilemma of corporate governance is the imperfect alignment of incentives between shareholders and managers, which can lead to behaviors and decisions by managers that are not in the interests of the firm's shareholders (Roe, 1994) . 4 When managers act in their own personal interest at the expense of shareholders, this results in agency costs for the firm's owners, reducing the level of shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . To assuage this cost, shareholders can use managerial incentives to help align the manager's interests with those of shareholders.
The degree of agency cost within a particular firm is then determined by the balance of control between (independent) shareholders and managers---the strength of the corporate governance of the firm. As the balance of control increasingly favors shareholders, incentives are put in place such that managers are more likely to engage in shareholder-maximizing activities.
By contrast, as managers have more control, they have greater discretion to engage in shareholdercostly activities.
First, we use average director tenure of the board (AVG TENURE) to proxy for board independence. Social network theory suggests that board members develop and solidify their friendship or social ties with management as their tenure on the board increases, making them less independent (e.g., Boeker and Goodstein, 1993; Wade et al., 1990; Vafeas, 2003; Harris and Helfat, 2007) . Activists and governing institutions such as the NACD (1996), CII (1998), and U.S.
Senate (2002) believe that longer service on the board does not bode well for monitoring management and as such, suggest tenure limits as a policy prescription.
5
However, director tenure as a proxy for board independence could be ambiguous. An alternative theory suggests a potential benefit of longer board service. The managerial talent paradigm posits that directors accumulate considerable experience and skill as their tenure on the board increases (Buchanan, 1974; Salancik, 1977; Vance, 1983) . Such directors are more confident and powerful, and more likely to challenge management when necessary.
Therefore, following Harjoto, Laksmana, and Lee (2014) and Coles, Daniel, Naveen (2014),
we use another measure of board independence, the percentage of board members hired before the CEO (% HIREBEFORE), which we argue is less ambiguous. If a board member is hired after the CEO, they are more likely to be "sympathetic" because the CEO often exerts considerable influence in the board nomination process (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Hwang and Kim, 2009) . In this paper, we use both AVG TENURE and % HIREBEFORE to measure board independence.
When considering executive compensation contracts, if CSR activities are an agency cost, 6 contractual incentives for CSR should be less likely to exist when the firm's board of directors has greater independence. However, if CSR activities maximize shareholder value, greater board 5 As a robustness check, we also used the fraction of the board that is composed of independent directors (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) as a proxy for board independence, and find consistent results. The caveat of this proxy is that most S&P 500 firms have fairly "independent" boards. 6 CSR activities that benefit the manager at the expense of the firm represent an agency cost. For example, if a CEO uses firm resources to advance a charitable cause that represents a self-serving interest of the CEO but that does not benefit the firm, it may be costly to the firm.
independence should predict a greater likelihood of incentives explicitly tied to CSR. We present these two competing hypotheses formally here:
H1a: If CSR maximizes shareholder value, board independence makes it more likely that a firm contracts on CSR.
H1b: If CSR is an agency cost, board independence makes it less likely that that a firm contracts on CSR.
In addition to board composition, shareholders themselves may serve as an important enforcement mechanism to reduce agency costs. Large institutional shareholders, by virtue of their significant ownership in firms, have both the incentives and power to monitor the decisions and activities of a firm's managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . Consistent with this hypothesis, institutional shareholders have been found to play an important role in preventing the enactment of amendments harmful to shareholders (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1988; Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988) , improving compensation practices by linking pay more directly with performance outcomes (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Matsumura and Shin, 2005) , and enhancing firm value as measured by Tobin's Q (McConnell and Servaes, 1990) . As a result, the presence of large institutional shareholders suggests that agency costs should be reduced within firms, leading to a testable set of competing hypotheses about their relationship with the presence of incentives for CSR in executive compensation contracts.
H2a: If CSR maximizes shareholder value, the likelihood of contracting on CSR is increasing in the number of large institutional shareholders.
H2b: If CSR is an agency cost, the likelihood of contracting on CSR is decreasing in the number of large institutional shareholders.
In contrast to strong corporate governance, increased managerial power means boards do not always bargain at arm's length because of management's influence over them. Sometimes managerial power is excessive compared to the efficient level suggested by optimal contracts (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999; Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002) . When managers have excessive power and become "entrenched", agency costs are much more likely to occur at the expense of shareholders (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002) .
Possessing higher degrees of managerial power also allows managers to have greater influence over how they are compensated, leading to overcompensation of managers through contract terms that are less transparent or more difficult to value (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) . Consequently, managers with greater influence over the structure of their compensation contracts will be more likely to have incentives for CSR if social performance activities represent an agency cost. For example, if CSR outcomes are more difficult to measure, CSR-based compensation may be a means by which some managers can more easily extract additional compensation. Alternatively, if CSR is not an agency cost, greater managerial power should predict fewer CSR-based contracts.
To measure managerial power, we begin by considering the percentage of shares outstanding owned by individual executives at a firm, following previous studies in the financial economics literature considering the effects of managerial power on firm outcomes (e.g., Davila and Venkatachalam, 2004; Moeller, 2005; Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008) . As the percentage of shares owned by an individual manager increases, the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms regulating their decisions becomes weaker, leading to greater influence on their part in determining the structure of their compensation contracts. We integrate the notion of managerial power with the perspective of CSR as an agency cost versus a shareholder value-enhancing activity with the following competing predictions:
H3a: If CSR maximizes shareholder value, the likelihood of contracting on CSR is decreasing in the level of top-manager ownership.
H3b: If CSR is an agency cost, the likelihood of contracting on CSR is increasing in the level of top-manager ownership.
As an additional measure of managerial power, we consider instances where executives are also members of a firm's board of directors. In contrast to the percentage of board members who are independent of the firm, overlapping membership between the top management team and a firm's board of directors can diminish the strength of a firm's corporate governance in regulating the decisions of managers, since managers who are board members can directly influence the board's decision making process, including their compensation (e.g., Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988; Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer, 2011) . We consider this additional measure of managerial power here:
H4a: If CSR maximizes shareholder value, the likelihood of contracting on CSR is reduced when the manager is also a director.
H4b: If CSR is an agency cost, the likelihood of contracting on CSR is increased when the manager is also a director.
A necessary condition for the previous hypotheses to be valid is that providing incentives to managers to engage in CSR actually generates higher levels of CSR within firms, suggesting that the incentive should be effective in increasing the level of CSR engagement by firms. If instead incentive contracts tied to CSR did not result in greater social performance, then stronger corporate governance is unlikely to predict a higher likelihood of observing executive compensation contracts linked to CSR. Ultimately, CSR must provide sufficient returns for firm financial performance in order to be worth investing in, and executive compensation contracts providing incentives for CSR must lead to actual improved social performance within firms. Our final hypothesis captures this necessary condition:
H5: If CSR maximizes shareholder value, contracting on CSR is associated with an increase in firm CSR.
Data and Measures
To test our hypotheses, we consider the sample of top five executives working at each firm in For our measures of managerial power, we follow prior empirical studies in the financial economics literature examining executive compensation to create two distinct variables. For our first measure, we calculate the percentage of shares outstanding owned by executives at a firm (e.g., Davila and Venkatachalam, 2004; Moeller, 2005; Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008) . For our second measure, we create a dummy variable equal to one if an executive is also a member of the firm's board of directors (e.g., Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988; Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer, 2011) . Both of these variables, SHROWN and EXECDIR, are constructed based on Execucomp data.
Controlling for the level of firm social performance is necessary in our analysis, because it may be that firms with better corporate governance also engage in more CSR activities, leading to potential omitted variable bias in our regressions and incorrect inferences. To measure the level of CSR activities by firms, we calculate the total number of KLD strengths minus concerns over a set of categories measuring CSR (variable CSRLEVEL), following the convention used by previous empirical studies ( Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Mishra and Suar, 2010) . We exclude industry-specific categories and the corporate governance category, and consider the KLD categories of community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product in our measure.
We also include several other control variables, commonly used in the CSR and executive compensation literature, in our analysis. To control for differences between the Chief Executive
Officer role and other executives in our sample that might affect the probability of observing 
Results and Discussion

Univariate Tests
To examine potential differences between firms with compensation contracts linked to CSR and those without contracts, we compare both types of firms in Table 2 . In general, CSR contracting is more common in larger firms with more independent boards, less insider ownership, lower financial performance (measured by ROA), higher social performance (measured by KLD scores), and lower advertising intensity. More independent boards, less insider ownership, and fewer executives who are also board members in CSR-contracting firms are consistent with our hypotheses that CSR is likely to be financially beneficial to firms (H1a, H3a, H4a). By contrast, the negative correlation between the number of block shareholders and the presence of compensation for CSR is consistent with CSR being a wasteful activity borne as an agency cost (H2b). However, we note that these correlations are not adjusted for industry and do not account for the correlation of our independent variables of interest with our other control variables. Table   3 reports the correlations between all the key variables. As a next step, we conduct multivariate tests to address these potential issues. Table 4 reports the results testing H1 and H2. In both cases, we find supporting evidence for hypotheses H1a and H2a. In particular, average director tenure is negatively related to the existence of CSR incentives (Column 2), while the percentage of board members hired prior to the CEO's arrival and the number of institutional block shareholders are positively associated with the presence of CSR compensation contracts (Columns 4 and 6, respectively). In terms of magnitude, a one year increase in average director tenure is associated with 7% lower odds of observing CSR incentives, a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of the board hired prior to the CEO's arrival is associated with 13% higher odds of CSR contracting, and the presence of one additional institutional block shareholder is associated with 8% higher odds of observing CSR compensation.
Multivariate Tests
Taken together, the results suggest firms with better corporate governance are substantially more likely to provide compensation contracts linked to CSR.
Examining the potential influence of greater managerial power, Table 5 reports results that support hypotheses H3a and H4a. The coefficient estimate on the fraction of shares owned by the individual executive is negative and significant at the 1% level for all specifications (Columns 1, 2 and 6). The estimate from Column 2 suggests that a one standard deviation increase in executive share ownership results in an 8% decrease in the odds of CSR contracting. The coefficient estimate for the dummy variable of whether or not the executive is also a board member (i.e., EXECDIR)
is modestly significant at the 10% level. Results in Column 4, with all controls, suggest that if an executive is also a board member, there is a 19% decrease in the odds of CSR contracting. However, although the magnitude is similar when including the fraction of executive shares owned in the same specification (Column 6), the coefficient estimate is no longer significant.
Taken together, the coefficient estimates for all four of our hypotheses provide consistent evidence that both improved corporate governance and reduced managerial power predicts a greater likelihood of observing compensation contracts tied to social performance. Our results suggest that CSR is not a form of managerial excess or agency cost, but may be beneficial to shareholders and firm financial performance.
Finally, we test whether the existence of compensation contracts tied to CSR is associated with higher levels of CSR activities at the firm level, with results shown in Table 6 . The coefficient estimate for CSRCONTRACTING is positive and significant across specifications, providing support for Hypothesis 5 and suggesting that contracting on CSR does improve firms' CSR level in the following year 9 , even after controlling for the firm's current level of social performance.
The results suggest that providing incentives for CSR to managers may be effective in improving firm social performance.
Conclusion
We investigated the link between corporate governance and executive compensation for CSR, and extended the agency cost perspective of CSR to develop our hypotheses. If CSR provides sufficient financial returns to shareholders, firms with stronger corporate governance should incentivize their managers to invest in social performance. However, if CSR represents managerial excess and is an agency cost, then firms with better governance should be less likely to provide incentives for CSR.
In our results, we found consistent evidence that CSR is likely to be financially beneficial for firms, and for shareholders. Firms with more shareholder-friendly governance are more likely to incentivize their managers to engage in CSR. Also, firms that provided compensation linked to CSR had greater levels of social performance on average, consistent with the notion that the provision of incentives for CSR leads to more CSR activities.
To our knowledge, our study is the first to document the prevalence of executive compensation contracts for CSR. Almost 40% of our sample, which consists of the Standard and Poor's 500
Index, includes some form of compensation for CSR to their top managers. Our future research will extend to smaller firms and multiple periods. In addition, better understanding exactly how and when firms choose to compensate executives for CSR provides fruitful opportunities for future research. By examining the role of corporate governance and agency cost explanations of CSR, our study aims to provide a first step in this direction. CSRLEVEL KLD scores (total strengths minus total concerns) aggregated across the categories of community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product.
Executive Characteristics
EXECDIR A dummy variable = 1 if an executive is also a board member and 0 otherwise.
SHROWN
The number of shares owned by the executive divided by the company's total shares outstanding CEO A dummy variable = 1 if executive is the CEO of the firm for the majority of the fiscal year and 0 if not.
Governance Characteristics
AVG TENURE
The average number of years the directors have been serving in the board.
% HIREBEFORE The percentage of board members hired before the CEO.
NUMBLOCKS
The number of block shareholders, where a block exists if an institution holds more than 5% of the firm's outstanding voting equity.
Firm characteristics
R&D
Total research and development expenses divided by total sales. AD Total advertising expenses divided by total sales.
BOOKLEVERAGE
Book leverage: Interest-bearing debt divided by total assets.
LOGSALES
The natural logarithm of total sales. ROA Return on assets: Net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by total assets.
principle, a CEO could be credited for doing well, poorly or both well and poorly on this dimension. For an example of the latter, the firm may experience an increase in promotions for women but a reduction in promotions for minorities. In this setting, the CEO's compensation would be based on the net results of these "strengths" and "concerns." Additionally, the CSR performance compensation payment is usually based on the net result of "strengths" and "concerns" across multiple categories. Hence, it could be that a given category of CSR compensation contains only "strengths" or "concerns." Nonetheless, the final payment to the CEO is based on the net result of all of the categories, which mirrors our empirical analysis.
